State v. Chernobieff Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 43112 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-9-2015
State v. Chernobieff Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43112
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Chernobieff Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43112" (2015). Not Reported. 2318.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2318
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 














Docket No. 43112 
APPELANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
Justice Gerald Schroeder, Senior District Court Judge 
ALAN TRIMMING 
Ada County Chief Public Def ender 
State of Idaho 
Ada County Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 287-7 400 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 83720 





OCT O 9 2015 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 














Docket No. 43112 
APPELANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
Justice Gerald Schroeder, Senior District Court Judge 
ALAN TRIMMING 
Ada County Chief Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
Ada County Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 




LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 83720 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................................... iii-iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................................ 1 
Nature of the Case ................................................................................................................ l 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ......................................................................................................... 1 
ISSUES ON APPEAL ..................................................................................................................... 3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 3 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 3 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
MAGISTRATE'S FINDINGS OF FACT WAS SUPPORTED BY 
SUB ST ANCIAL AND COMPETANT EVIDENCE .......................................................... 8 
IL THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION 
TO SUPRESS THE RESULTS OF THE BLOOD DRAW .............................................. 10 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ...................................................................................................... 14 
11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGES 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006) .......................................................... 6 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 145 S. Ct. 280 (1925) .................................................................. 4 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971L ........................................................ 4 
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S. Ct. 776 (1961) .................................................................. 6 
Cupp v. Mwphy, 412 U.S. 291, 93 S. Ct. 2000 (1973) .......................................................................... 6 
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623 (1963L ............................................................................. 6 
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S. Ct. 191(1948) ............................................................ 4, 6 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978L ....................................................................... 6 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978L ................................................................. 7 
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._, 133 S. Ct 1552 (2013) .................................................................... 8 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966) ................................................ 5, 6, 7, 8, 11 
State v. Cooper, 136 Idaho 697, 39 P.3d 637 (Ct. App. 2001) .................................................................... 5 
State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483,680 P.2d 1383 (Ct. App. 1984) ................................................................. 5 
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008) ................................................................... 5 
State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786,979 P.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1999) ............................................................... 5 
State v. Smith, 355 P.3d 644 (Ct. App. 201 
State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 897 P.2d 993 (1995) .................................................................. 3 
1,13,5 
State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496,501, 163 P. 3d 1208, 1213 (Ct. App. 2007) ........................................... 7 
State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989L ................................................................ .3, 4, 5 
State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470,472, 65 P. 3d 211, 213 (Ct. App. 2002) ............................................ 7 
State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416,423,337 P.3d 575, 582 (2014) ............................................................... JO 
1ll 
Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 105 S. Ct. 409 (1984) ..................................................................... 4 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977L ............................................................ 5 
States v. Chapel, F.3d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1995) ........................................................ 5, 8 
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) ................................................................................. 8 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1645 (1967L ............................................ 5, 6 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984L ........................................................................................ 6 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
U.S. Const. amend. 
Idaho Const., Art. 1, § 17 ........................................................................................................................ 4 
lV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Daniel Chemobieff appeals the denial of his motion to suppress the results of a 
warrantless blood draw. Following the magistrate's denial of the motion, Mr. Chemobieff 
entered a conditional guilty plea. On appeal, the District court affirmed the Magistrate's denial 
of the motion to suppress. Mr. Chemobieff brings this appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. On 
appeal, Mr. Chemobieff contends that 1) that the Magistrate's finding of facts were not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence, and 2) there were insufficient facts to make the 
determination that an exigency excused the requirement for a warrant. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On September 11, 2013, at about 11:00 p.m. Idaho State Police Corporal Matthew Sly 
responded to a traffic stop. 1 Upon arrival, he started investigating the driver of the vehicle, 
Daniel Chemobieff, for possible driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI").2 When he 
approached the car, Corporal Sly noticed the odor of an alcoholic beverage.3 He also noted that 
Mr. Chemobieffhad glassy and bloodshot eyes. 4 Corporal Sly began to speak with Mr. 
Chemobieff and his responses were slow and lethargic. 5 Based upon his experience, Corporal 
Sly asked Mr. Chemobieff to perform the standard field sobriety tests.6 Mr. Chemobieff 
declined to take any of the standard field sobriety tests.7 
1 Transcript, p. 8, In. 3-7. 
2 Tr., p. 9, In. 3. 
3 Tr., p. 10, In. 5-10. 
4 Id. 
5 Tr., p. 13, In. 9-14. 
6 Tr., p. 15, In. 4-8. 
7 Tr., p. 15, In. 9-10. 
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Based upon Mr. Chemobieff's refusal, Corporal Sly placed him under arrest for suspicion of 
DUI and placed him in his patrol car.8 Once in the car, Corporal Sly played the audio version of 
the administrative license suspension to Mr. Chemobieff, and began to count the required fifteen 
minute wait period for a breath test.9 Mr. Chemobieff subsequently declined the breath test. Io 
Corporal Sly then contacted the on-call prosecutor in order to begin the process of 
obtaining a warrant to draw Mr. Chemobieff's blood. 11 The prosecutor on duty informed 
Corporal Sly to transport Mr. Chemobieffback to the jail, and he would set up a conference call 
with the on-call magistrate in order to obtain a search warrant. I2 While Corporal Sly and Mr. 
Chemobieff were en route to the jail, the prosecutor had been unable to reach the on-call 
magistrate. 13 The first attempt for a conference call at the jail was unsuccessful.I4 The on-call 
prosecutor informed Corporal Sly that he would try to contact the on-call magistrate again, and 
then call Corporal Sly back in five or ten minutes_ Is In total, the prosecutor attempted to contact 
the magistrate three to five times. 16 
When the prosecutor called Corporal Sly back, he had still been unable to get in touch 
with the magistrate. 17 No warrant was obtained to take Mr. Chemobieff's blood. 18 Since the on-
call magistrate could not be reached, the prosecutor authorized Corporal Sly to take Mr. 
Chemobieff's blood without a warrant with the default of there being exigent circumstances. 19 
There was a five to ten minute delay between the unsuccessful call and the decision to draw Mr. 
8 Tr., p. 15, In. 14-22. 
9 Tr., p. 15 In. 23- p.16, In. 1. 
10 Tr., p. 16, In. 5-9. 
11 Tr., p. 16, In. 21 - p. 17, In. 12. 
12 Tr. p. 26, In. 7-12. 
13 Tr. p. 26, In. 16-25. 
14 Tr. p. 27, In. 3-8. 
15 Tr. p. 18, In. 22-24. 
16 Tr. p. 27, In 11-12. 
17 Tr. p. 19, In 2-5. 
18 Tr. p. 19, In 18-20. 
19 Tr. p. 19, In 22-24. 
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Chemobieff s blood.2° Corporal Sly called a phlebotomist to the jail and the phlebotomist 
performed a blood draw with no further problems.21 It was later determined that the on-call 
magistrate had turned off the ringer on his cellular phone.22 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
MAGISTRATE'S FINDINGS OF FACT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUB ST ANCIAL 
AND COMPET ANT EVIDENCE. 
2. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF 
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE RESULTS OF THE BLOOD DRAW. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a 
motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are 
supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles 
to the facts as found. State v. Smith, 355 P.3d 644 (Ct. App. 20l5)(citing State v. Atkinson, 128 
Idaho 559,561,916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996)). At a suppression hearing, the power to 
assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual 
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 
997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 
ARGUMENT 
Drawing a person's blood constitutes a search and requires that the State have a warrant 
or a valid exception to the warrant requirement must apply. In particular, a blood draw is a 
severely intrusive search of a person's body which brings it under the ambient of the Fourth 
Amendment. State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368,370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989). Both the Idaho 
20 I Tr. p. 18, n. 22-24 
21 Tr. p. 20, In. 3-20. 
22 Tr., p. 27, In. 14-16. 
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and United States Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. 
Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const., Art. 1, § 17. Because of this protection, any warrantless search 
is presumptively invalid. Woolery, 116 Idaho at 3 70, 755 P.2d at 1212. If a search is conducted 
without a warrant, the burden falls on the State to justify why police saw fit to disregard the 
citizens Constitutional rights. Id. 
The warrant requirement is so central to the Fourth Amendment that warrantless searches 
are presumed to be unreasonable. "In a long line of cases, this Court has stressed that searches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and 
well delineated exceptions." Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20, 105 S. Ct. 409, 410-11 
(1984) (internal quotation omitted). "The exceptions are jealously and carefully drawn, and there 
must be a showing by those who seek exemption ... that the exigencies of the situation made 
that course imperative." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032 
(1971) (internal quotation omitted). "In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably 
practicable, it must be used .... " Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156, 45 S. Ct. 280, 286 
(1925). 
Magistrates serve an important function in our legal system. "Absent some grave 
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the 
police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal 
activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in 
order to enforce the law." McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455, 69 S. Ct. 1623 (1948). 
While officers on scene are likely to be hurried, excited and intent on securing an arrest, a neutral 
and detached magistrate serves to safeguard the constitutional liberties of the suspect. "[T]he 
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detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, [] is a more reliable safeguard against improper 
searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 
2484 (1977) (internal quotation omitted) (abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 
500 U.S. 565 (1991)). Simply stated, without a magistrate standing guard between police and 
citizens, the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningless. Under the exigent circumstances 
exception, police may conduct warrantless searches and seizures when the facts available 
indicate that an "emergency exists in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant would 
threaten the loss or destruction of evidence." United States v. Chapel, 55 F.3d 1416, 1419 (9th 
Cir. 1995). 
It is therefore incumbent upon the State to justify any warrantless blood draw. 
Warrantless blood draws can be justified by the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement. See, e.g., State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989) (Defendant 
involved in multi-car collision resulting in a death and the defendant was taken to the hospital); 
State v. Cooper, 136 Idaho 697, 39 P.3d 637 (Ct. App. 2001) (Defendant involved in multi-car 
collision resulting in a death and defendant was flown to hospital by helicopter); State v. Curtis, 
106 Ida..11.o 483,680 P.2d 1383 (Ct. App. 19·84) (Defendant involved in multi-car collision 
resulting in a death and defendant was taken to hospital by ambulance); State v. De Witt, 145 
Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008) (Defendant seriously injured in accident and taken to 
hospital by ambulance). However, in this case, the law enforcement officer was not faced with 
any emergency or other exigent circumstances that would justify this warrantless blood draw. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized only a few well delineated situations in 
which the exigent circumstances exception applies. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 
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38, 42-43 (1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299, 87 
S. Ct. 1642, 1945 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771 (1966) 
(destruction of evidence); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 2004 (1973) 
(same); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623 (1963) (same); lvfichigan v. Tyler, 436 
U.S. 499, 509, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1950 (1978) (ongoing fire). "Prior decisions of this Court, 
however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are few in number and 
carefully delineated." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) (internal quotation 
omitted). "Police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need" for a 
warrantless search under the exigent circumstances exception. Id, 466 U.S. at 749-750. "When 
an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought to be in a position to justify it by 
pointing to some real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a 
warrant." Id., at 751 (citing McDonald, 335 U.S. at 460, 69 S. Ct. at 199). 
The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to delay their investigation if doing so 
would endanger the lives of themselves or others. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). When officers are faced with a situation where the 
delay in obtaining a warrant could result in the destruction of evidence, an exigency may also 
exist. Ker, 374 U.S. at 40-41; Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). When determining whether 
there is a risk of destruction of evidence sufficient to excuse a warrant, courts also consider the 
seriousness of the offense. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 751. Just because evidence will be destroyed in a 
particular case does not necessarily mean that an exigent circumstances exception applies. See, 
e.g., Johnson, 333 U.S. 10 (warrantless search not appropriate simply because opium fumes were 
dissipating); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S. Ct. 776 (1961) (warrantless search 
not appropriate simply because whiskey mash smell may dissipate); Welsh, 466 U.S. 740 
6 
(warrantless seizure of defendant not appropriate simply because blood alcohol level was 
dissipating). 
Idaho Courts have also recognized that "[t]he exigent circumstances exception allows 
agents of the State to conduct a warrantless search when there is a 'compelling need for official 
action and no time to secure a warrant."' State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 472, 65 P. 3d 
211, 213 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509). "The exigent circumstances 
exception does not apply where there is time to secure a warrant." State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 
496, 501, 163 P. 3d 1208, 1213 (Ct. App. 2007). 
This exception does not serve to streamline police procedures or investigations. "The 
mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard 
of the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978). 
"The investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the 
Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who ,:vrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a 
person's home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in 
enforcement of the criminal law." Id. 
In some situations, drawing an individual's blood may fall into the category of being 
considered exigent circumstances. The Supreme Court recognized that a warrantless blood draw 
could fall under the exigent circumstances exception in Schmerber v. California. In Schmerber, 
the defendant was involved in a serious car accident that required his hospitalization and a police 
investigation of the crash. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 771. The Court engaged in an 
exigent circumstances analysis and concluded that "[g]iven these special facts", this warrantless 
blood draw falls within the exception. Id. The fact the defendant's blood alcohol content 
("BAC") BAC was diminishing was only one of the factors the Court considered in reaching its 
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conclusion. Also important to the Court's analysis was the fact that the officer had to spend time 
to conduct an accident investigation, and the fact that defendant had to be taken to the hospital to 
assessed for injuries. Id. Given these two additional delays, coupled with the fact that 
defendant's BAC was dropping, the Court found that exigent circumstances existed to negate the 
warrant requirement. The Court concluded by stating, "[i]t bears repeating, however, that we 
reach this judgment only on the facts of the present record." Id., at 772. 
The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided the issue of the constitutionality of warrantless, 
involuntary blood draws in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). In 
McNeely the Court declared that "in those drunk driving investigations where police officer's can 
reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly 
undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates they do so." Id. at 
1561. Under the exigent circumstances exception, police may conduct warrantless searches and 
seizures when the facts available indicate that an "emergency exists in which the delay necessary 
to obtain a warrant would threaten the loss or destruction of evidence" or life. United States v. 
Chapel, 55 F.3d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1995). 
Mr. Chemobieff contends that 1) that the magistrate's finding of facts were not supported 
by substantial and competent evidence, and 2) there were insufficient facts to make the 
determination that an exigency excused the requirement for a warrant. Therefore, the results of 
Mr. Chernbieff' s blood draw should be suppressed. 
I. THE DISTRlCT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE MAGISTRATE'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANCIAL AND COMPETANT 
EVIDENCE. 
The facts used to support the magistrate's denial of the motion to suppress were not 
supported by competent and substantial evidence. The magistrate did not make a clear finding 
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that Mr. Chemobieff's delayed the investigation and further, it is unclear. It is also unclear that 
the factual basis for denying the motion was actually the factors used by the magistrate in 
denying the motion to suppress. 
First, the Magistrate did not make a clear finding that Mr. Chemobieff caused any delay 
in the process. The District Court stated that the magistrate found that Mr. Chemobieff delayed 
the investigation. But, when asked about delay, the magistrate stated, "All I am saying is he 
wasn't cooperating .... .It may-may or may not have been a time delay."23 
Also, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that this instance of failure was a one-
time event. The District Court determined that the lynch pin of the analysis for the totality of the 
circumstances to the exigency exception to the warrant requirement depended on the failure of 
the system in place for an on-call magistrate.24 As noted by the District Court after affirming the 
magistrate: 
However, and this is a very weighty however, this breakdown have been exposed 
and can be addressed by a redundancy system, at least where multiple judges are 
available. The logic of the old adage that every dog gets one bite is applicable in 
this realm. It is very unlikely that a failure in the judicial process in the future will 
not weigh as an exigency unless that failure is tied to a failure of equipment of 
some other factor not controllable in the court system itself.25 
In this case, there was nothing in the record to show that this was the first and only time that such 
a breakdown of the on-call magistrate system had occurred. If the failure of the system is to be a 
factor in evaluating the totality of the circumstances, then it is necessary to know if the same 
problem had happened before. Many of the other factors were determined to be common 
conditions and not significant in evaluating the totality of the circumstances.26 
23 Tr. pg. 49, In. 49. 
24 Opinion on Appeal, pg. 6. 
25 Opinion on Appeal, pg. 7. 
26 Opinion on Appeal, pg. 6. 
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As a result, the findings of fact used by the District Court and the magistrate were not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. THereofre, do not support the 
denial of Mr. Chernobieff's Motion to Suppress. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS THE RESULTS OF THE BLOOD DRAW. 
Mr. Chernobieff asserts that the even if the facts found by the magistrate are supported by the 
record, the Magistrate did not consider the totality of the circumstances when finding an 
exception to the warrant requirement. 
First, the magistrate's analysis consisted of the good faith attempts by the prosecutor in 
trying to obtain a warrant to draw Mr. Chernobieff's blood. In clarification of his ruling, the 
magistrate said that because the prosecutor acted in good faith, a warrant was not required.27 This 
only factor is what the magistrate principally relied upon when denying the motion. Such a 
weighty factor is not appropriate. As stated in McNeeley, "to determine whether a law 
enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant, this Court looks 
to the totality of the circumstances." McNeeley, at 1559. The McNeeley Court was clear that 
there should be no per se exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
In this case, the magistrate's ruling creates aper se category for an exigency exception. 
The magistrate found that there was a good faith effort by the State to obtain a search warrant 
prior to drawing Mr. Chemobieff's blood.28 The categorical exception in this case would be that 
if the system to quickly have a magistrate issue a warrant fails, then the exigent circumstances 
would automatically exist and the prosecutor may authorize the officer to draw blood without a 
warrant. This categorical approach to alleviating the requirement to obtain a search warrant is 
27 Tr., p. 48, ln21-24. 
28 Tr. p. 48, In. 21-23. 
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exactly the type of categorical exception both McNeeley and State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416,423, 
P.3d 575,582 (2014) found to be unconstitutional. 
In this case, the exigency was not a situation that the officer encountered and had to make 
a quick decision. Instead, the system created to quickly issue warrants caused the exigency. 
More specifically, situation's urgency was based on human error of the on call magistrate having 
the ringer turned off, rather than a failure of external circumstances. The inability to obtain a 
warrant in this case was much different than the situation law enforcement faced in Schemerber. 
In Schmerber, the officer concluded that it would have taken too long to obtain a warrant. The 
officer suspected that the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol after seeing him in the 
hospital nearly two hours after his first encounter with the Defendant. Schmerber, 384 at 769, 86 
S. Ct. at 1835. In that case, the Court determined that it was reasonable for the officer to draw 
blood where he had already taken the time to bring the defendant to the hospital and investigate 
the scene of the accident. Schmerber, 384 at 770-1, 86 S. Ct. at 1836. There was simply no 
time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. 
The McNeeley Court stated that, "technological developments that enable to police 
officers to secure warrants more quickly, and do so withoutundermining the neutral role of the 
magistrate judge's essential role as a check on the police discretion, are relevaI1t to the 
assessment of the exigency." McNeeley, 113 S. Ct. at 1562. 
In this case, Corporal Sly testified that there was only a five to ten minute delay between 
the lack of response from the magistrate and the prosecutor directing him to take Mr. 
Chemobieff's blood.29 Once the magistrate could not be reached, the prosecutor determined that 
there was an exigency.30 The system in place only required the magistrate to answer the phone in 
29 2 Tr. Pg. 18, In. 0-24. 
30 Tr. Pg. 28, In. 2-9. 
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order to have the warrant heard. Even ifthere were no back-up magistrates immediately 
available, there was no record that there is any danger of evidence destruction. After the 
prosecutor determined that there was an exigency, there was another waiting period for the 
phlebotomist to show up to the jail to draw the blood.31 This could have been time used to make 
additional attempts to contact the magistrate. There also could have been attempts to contact the 
magistrate through alternative methods. 
In fact, the prosecutor stated that since they were unable to reach the on call magistrate, 
he would "default back to exigent circumstances that would provide an exception to the warrant 
requirement due to the unavailability of securing a warrant in a timely fashion."32 Such a position 
is exactly what McNeeley states should not exist with warrantless blood draws: a categorical 
"default" position that may be relied upon. Instead, if there were true exigent circumstances, 
such a conclusion should be rendered according to the totality of the circumstances, instead of 
relying on one per se exception. 
The factors listed by the District Court were insufficient to affirm the magistrate's 
conclusion as well. As noted above, it was unclear whether or not the magistrate actually found 
that Mr. Chemobieff caused any delay in the investigation.33 There is also no evidence to show 
that there was any time delay of the blood draw, other than the five-to-ten minutes that elapsed 
while the on call prosecutor attempted to call the magistrate. 34 There is no support for the 
conclusion that the inability to reach a magistrate by its on-call system contributes to an 
exigency. 
31 Tr. Pg. 19, In. 22 - Pg. 20, In. 10. 
32 Tr. p. 28, In. 2-9. 
33 Tr. pg. 49, Ln. 15-20. 
34 Tr. p. 18, In. 20-24. 
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The exception used by the State in this case is an impermissible categorical exception to 
warrant requirement. Since the State could not immediately obtain a search warrant, it 
defaulted to the exigency exception to the warrant requirement to draw Mr. Chemobieffs blood 
where an exigency did not exist. Therefore the result of the warrantless blood draw should be 
suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Chemobieff asserts that the magistrate erred in denying his motion to suppress by 
failing to apply the correct legal standard. Additionally, Mr. Chemobieff asserts that the District 
Court erred in affirming the Magistrate's denial of the motion to suppress. Mr. Chemobieff 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the denial of the Motion to Suppress. 
DATED this 9th day of October, 2015. 
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